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The promise and reality of decentralization: a critical appraisal of Sierra Leone’s primary 
health care system 
 
Abstract 
 
Post-war reconstruction in Sierra Leone was accompanied by an ambitious donor-promoted 
decentralization programme aimed at making delivery of the country’s failing social services more 
efficient. A decade after the ‘decentralization’ of health services, this article examines systemic 
failures that have resulted in de-concentration rather than devolution of the health system. It 
identifies four factors that have contributed to a dysfunctional decentralized provision of primary 
health care. First, is an inconsistent political and legal framework that blurs and distorts delineations 
of authority between central and subnational government institutions. This leads to three further 
challenges that interact to create an ineffective public health sector: the central government is 
resistant to devolution, partly due to a culture of accumulation; local-level interventions are 
uncoordinated; and there is limited accountability for frontline health workers. As a result, citizens’ 
health needs are unmet. Sierra Leone is plagued by some of the worst maternal and child mortality 
rates in the world, and faced the most intractable outbreak of the 2014-2015 Ebola epidemic. 
Drawing on participant observation and interview data, this article suggests that building a resilient 
decentralised primary healthcare system will largely depend on the willingness of the centre to 
meaningfully devolve power and resources to subnational governments, and establish a mutual 
accountability mechanism in which ‘actors’ at all levels are held accountable. 
 
Key words: Sierra Leone, decentralization, primary health care, local councils, district health 
management teams, NGOs. 
 
Introduction 
 
In 2004, the Government of Sierra Leone (GoSL), with support from development partners, 
embarked on an ambitious programme of decentralization as a response to governance failures 
that were blamed in part for the country’s 11-year civil war. Part of the official rationale for the 
programme was to make the delivery of social services more efficient and reduce the waste and 
graft that undermined service delivery, including that of primary health care (PHC). A 2004 
public expenditure tracking survey, for example, discovered that although the country’s central 
medical stores reported supplying essential drugs worth 40.9 million Leones to secondary and 
tertiary hospitals, medical officers only acknowledged receipt of drugs estimated at 28 million 
Leones (Government of Sierra Leone 2006). The country’s post-war decentralization policy 
notes that, ‘the goal of Sierra Leone’s decentralization is to ensure that the local people and their 
communities are empowered and fully involved in political and socio-economic development 
processes’ (Government of Sierra Leone, 2010a:4). However, after a decade of decentralization, 
the country continues to register some of the highest maternal and child mortality rates in the 
world. The free health care initiative launched in 2010 to address the challenges relating to the 
healthcare needs of vulnerable citizens, such as under-fives, pregnant women and lactating 
mothers, has not made a significant impact in reducing maternal and child mortality rates, partly 
due to the lack of a coherent law or policy guiding its implementation. Moreover, the recent 
Ebola epidemic has exposed the systemic failings of the delivery of healthcare, prompting a 
debate as to why the virus completely crippled the health system.   
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The central question this research addresses is why, after extensive post-war developmental 
interventions, Sierra Leone’s decentralization efforts have failed to transform a dysfunctional 
primary healthcare system. It analyses a political economy in which the interaction between law 
and policy, central and subnational authority, and frontline health staff and service users remains 
contested and blurred. The research highlights the extent to which the resulting failings in 
primary healthcare manifest themselves within the context of a decentralized health system, and 
the implications for reforms in the sector. The article argues that, whereas the devolution of 
powers to subnational institutions for the provision of services was initially seen as a panacea for 
the country’s failing health services by the government and donors, the failure to address long 
standing systemic weaknesses in the pre-existing structure, on top of which post-war 
decentralization reforms were built, made the resulting dysfunction inevitable.  
The Ministry of Health and Sanitation (MoHS) has performed relatively well in ‘devolving’ its 
functions to the local councils compared to other ministries (Whiteside 2007), yet even this semi-
‘successful’ process continues to be plagued by a number of challenges that undermine the 
delivery of health services. Both national and subnational politicians have paid a great deal of 
attention to the rebuilding and expansion of the sector’s battered physical infrastructure: tangible 
improvements that arguably garner them political capital. However, the less visible system itself 
remains largely inefficient due to a number of factors that have undermined the stated goal of 
decentralization. To identify and understand these sub-institutional political processes, the 
research draws on interviews with a range of informants, including central government officials, 
local council staff, service users, NGOs staff and donors. Fieldwork was carried out in Sierra 
Leone between August 2011 and July 2015, with a review of secondary data used to illuminate 
the Ebola-related context. 
 
The article has five sections. Following the introduction is a survey of literature on 
decentralization in Africa, and the challenges of implementation in Sierra Leone. The second 
section gives an overview of the country’s health delivery system, examining and analyzing the 
different layers of the delivery architecture, the legal and policy framework underpinning the 
delivery of health services, as well as the systemic and political economic factors driving the 
health ministry’s resistance to devolution. The third section examines the fragile process of 
coordinating the activities of local actors delivering health services, looking at their conflicting 
spending preferences, erratic intergovernmental transfers, and the uncoordinated operations of 
health NGOs. The fourth section discusses the primary healthcare infrastructure, including 
staffing and the management of health facilities; and the fifth concludes. 
 
The context 
  
Decentralization is arguably one of the most popular governance policies of the post-cold war 
era. Even where there has not been a full-scale or national programme of decentralization, many 
countries have decentralized some aspects of governance or service provision. Its appeal rests on 
the normative benefits attributed to the policy. Decentralization is designed to better guarantee 
fairness through the equitable allocation of resources to marginalised groups and communities 
(Bossert et al 2000:1). It is also expected to improve the transparency, quality, legitimacy, and 
accountability of service provision due to the participation and oversight of end users in the 
planning and delivery of services (Rondinelli and Cheema 1983; Manor 1999; Crook 2003; 
Crawford and Hartmann 2008). Accordingly, it is seen as potentially able to improve allocation 
of ‘services and expenditures’ by tying them more directly to the preferences of local users, and 
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to improve efficiency in service provision through greater cost awareness at the community level 
(Rondinelli 1981; Rondinelli and Cheema 1983; World Bank 1988; Manor 1999; Brinkerhoff 
and Azfar 2010). 
 
Poor and marginalized communities often perceive large governance institutions as 
unaccountable, remote, and corrupt (Gaventa 2004). Decentralization offers an adapted approach 
designed to increase participation in political and development processes within local 
communities, whereby citizens can make demands on government and hold them accountable 
(Crawford and Hartmann 2008; Crook 2003; Manor 1999; Rondinelli and Cheema 1983). Also, 
because people participate in political and development processes, they are able to make inputs 
into development plans, while at the same time increasing their self-efficacy and confidence 
(Wagle 2006; Ribot, 2006; Osmani 2008). Further, as states decentralize, the space for local 
constituents to express their voice and concerns with local politicians widens (Hiskey 2010; 
Brinkerhoff and Azfar 2010). Commenting on the potential of decentralization, Blair suggests 
that, ‘the hope is that as government comes closer to the people, more people will participate in 
politics’; a fact ‘that will give them representation, a voice in public policy decisions which will 
affect their futures’ (2000:23). 
 
In the health sector in Africa, decentralization has been driven by the Bamako Initiative, 
launched at the 1987 World Health Organization Regional Meeting of the African Ministers of 
Health (Paganini 2004; Bossert et al 2000; Obioha and Molale 2011). The main thrust of the 
Bamako Initiative was for governments to continue to pay health workers’ salaries, incur some 
of the recurrent cost of delivering health services, and enable service users to take a ‘leading 
role’ in the management of health facilities (Paganini 2004:12). Given the fact that primary 
health care is ‘the first level of contact for individuals, the family and the community within the 
national health system’ (Obioha and Molale 2011:73), its decentralization through the use of 
District Health Management Teams (DHMTs) was seen as a major step in making quality 
healthcare accessible and affordable. Paganini described the role of communities as ‘not 
expected to contribute more resources out of their pocket, but on the contrary to receive better 
quality services, curative as well as preventive, from a fraction of what they were already 
spending in the informal system’ (2004:12). This cost reduction would be achieved through 
improved infrastructure, staff training, and supply of drugs and consumables, all under the 
oversight of community representatives (Paganini 2004). 
 
Despite the lofty aims of the Bamako declaration and initiatives to improve health services for 
the poor, there has been a mismatch between such aims and the reality (Bossert et al 2000). As 
Gaventa observes, there is evidence that ‘democratic decentralization simply opens up space for 
the empowerment of local elites, not for consideration of the voices and interests of the more 
marginalized’ (2004: 32). In some instances, there are infrequent elections and they are often 
contested on the platform of ethnicity and personalities rather than on any coherent programme 
of positive change. In Uganda, where decentralization was introduced primarily to increase civic 
participation in politics and development, empirical studies show that the process has not led to 
any significant increase in citizens’ participation, especially in health care provision. In a study 
of the impact of decentralization on health delivery in Uganda, the findings revealed that the 
state of primary health care in 1996 was the same as in 1986, as pervasive administrative and 
operational problems remained unchanged (Golooba-Mutebi 2005).  
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Many attempts to decentralize the provision of services have produced considerable disparities 
between citizens’ health needs and the services provided by subnational governments. A study of 
decentralization in Ghana found a lack of congruence between District Assembly-funded outputs 
and popular preferences for health services (Crook, 2003:80). In Nigeria, Crook and Sverrisson 
have argued that after years of decentralization, there was a lack of meaningful community 
decision-making, ‘whether direct or indirect, in primary health care, even though responsibility 
was devolved to elected officials at the local level’ (2001: 35). The programme had adverse 
effects, including, ‘declining confidence in local health committees, as there were doubts that 
their deliberations and recommendations were being taken seriously’:  
 
Overall, local residents saw [primary healthcare] as unreliable, ineffective and unresponsive to 
their needs. In addition, councillors were unaware of the health needs of constituents, had little 
contact with communities, and had little knowledge of health plans and activities (Crook and 
Sverrisson 2001: 35).  
 
Commenting on the failure of decentralization to improve primary health care provision in 
Nigeria, Wunsch and Olowu (1996-7) have also noted that community consciousness of the 
primary health care system and administration was negligible, intermittently absent, to the point 
that by 1993 there was little or no indication of an active debate around the issue. Similar 
findings have been reported for other countries in Africa with the result of undermining the 
normative case for decentralization (Crook and Manor, 1998; Smoke, 1993).  
 
Sierra Leone’s ongoing decentralization programme has produced mixed results in a number of 
sectors, with central government ministries continuing to resist the devolution of functions to 
councils. The country’s programme has been lauded by some as a successful example of post-
conflict decentralization reforms, with local council elections that have opened up space for 
increased local political participation (Zhou 2009; Zhou and Zhang 2009; World Bank 2014). 
However, others have questioned such optimism. In the education sector, Whiteside (2007:15) 
has argued that the Ministry has had to ‘grapple with issues of loss of control and power’ and 
‘greater challenges in mobilizing the necessary political will at all levels to push decentralization 
forward’. Meanwhile, the procurement figures for teaching and learning materials quoted in the 
individual budgets of local councils (Searle, 2008) may not match what is eventually delivered to 
them by the ministry of education, or be of the same monetary value, given that councils are not 
involved in procurement (Kargbo 2009). 
 
A similar situation exists in agriculture, one of the government’s priority sectors, which has 
retained the bulk of the budget centrally for the procurement of equipment and seed rice. It has 
been estimated that between 60 to 70 per cent of the Ministry of Agriculture’s non-recurrent 
budget is still held in the capital, with the 19 local councils sharing the remainder (Conteh 
2014a). The practice of central government ministries carrying out procurement and other 
functions and responsibilities that should have been transferred to the councils under 
decentralization undermines their capacities and leaves room for misappropriation and under-
procurement. The next section analyses how these efforts and challenges play out in Sierra 
Leone’s health care delivery system.  
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Sierra Leone’s health care delivery system 
 
The structure of Sierra Leone’s health delivery system is multifaceted, with players ranging from 
the biggest provider – the government – to smaller actors, including local and international 
NGOs, faith based organizations, and private health service providers (Government of Sierra 
Leone 2009a; Audit Service Sierra Leone 2012). In terms of coverage, MoHS through its 
hospitals and peripheral health units delivers an estimated 50 per cent of health care services, 
with the remainder being provided by the private or non-profit sector (Renner et al 2005; World 
Health Organization, 2005). As in other countries in West Africa, the private sector, like the 
public sector, is underdeveloped, uncoordinated, and focuses mostly on curative rather than 
preventive medicine. It is made up of a chain of pharmacies and clinics located mainly in urban 
centres and accessed primarily by the economically secure, who can afford to pay high medical 
fees (Institutional Reform and Capacity Building Project 2008; Government of Sierra Leone 
2009a). 
   
Given the high levels of poverty in the country, and in rural areas in particular, the majority of 
the health facilities are in the public sector. Based on the primary health care programme 
developed in the 1980s, these facilities and the system that depends upon them originated in the 
structural adjustment programme era, when Bretton Woods institutions forced governments to 
cut spending on health care, and encouraged community financing of health services in its place 
(Paganini 2004). The public health delivery system has three interrelated and complementary 
components. Peripheral Health Units (PHUs) are the first and most basic level of care, found 
primarily in rural communities where the majority of Sierra Leoneans live. PHUs consist of three 
sub-components, of which the Community Health Centre (CHC) is the biggest, followed by the 
Community Health Post (CHP), and Maternal and Child Health Post (MCHP). Together, they 
constitute the frontline of the healthcare system (Government of Sierra Leone 2009a; Audit 
Service Sierra Leone 2012). The second component comprises district hospitals for secondary 
care, scattered across the country’s district headquarter towns and cities. The third level of care 
consists of the regional or national hospitals utilised for tertiary care, found only in the regional 
headquarters (Kirigia et al 2012; Government of Sierra Leone 2009a, 2010b; 2011). The total 
number of PHUs in Sierra Leone remains in flux, as new ones spring up regularly, and 
sometimes without central coordination. However, at the time of writing, the country had ‘about 
1,390 PHUs registered with the Ministry of Health’ (Interview with Monitoring and Evaluation 
Officer, Directorate of Primary Health Care, 7 August 2013, Freetown). 
 
The lack of effective central coordination in construction of new physical infrastructure for 
health service delivery is indicative of the functionality of the current legal and policy framework 
for decentralization. The current challenges besetting service delivery are rooted in the weak, 
conflicting and inconsistent regulatory mechanisms. The country’s current health delivery 
system is predicated on a number of legal and policy documents – including the Local 
Government Act (LGA) 2004, Hospital Boards Act (HBA) of 2003, Hospital Board Amendment 
Act of 2007, National Health Policy of 2002, and the National Health Sector Strategic plan 2010. 
Despite the fact that some of them were simultaneously drafted, they often contradict each other 
and other legislations. The lack of clarity in law and policy suggests that the implementation of 
the decentralization programme has been based on an unfounded assumption of a culture of 
collaboration between government ministries and agencies, which have not always worked 
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together. As a result, not much attention has been given to the process of repealing or amending 
obsolete and sometimes conflicting laws that established Ministries, Departments, and Agencies 
(MDA) working in health and other sectors with competing functions and powers (Gaima 2009).  
 
Inconsistent and obsolete laws regulating the health sector have become ‘excuses of 
convenience’ that underpin the ministries’, departments’, and agencies’ justifications for failing 
to devolve powers and resources to the local councils. MDA representatives constantly argue – 
rightly or wrongly – that the laws do not allow them to do so. Even though the Local 
Government Act post-dates the Hospital Boards Act, the two are in conflict with each other on a 
number of key issues (Interview with Legal and Policy Officer, Decentralization Secretariat, 
Freetown, 2 November 2011, Freetown). For example, whereas the LGA devolves the 
management of secondary hospitals to the local councils, the HBA gives a controlling function to 
the Minister of Health, who appoints board members, including the chairman, with only a 
tokenistic provision made for inclusion of ‘a representative of the appropriate District Council’.1   
 
Amendments were made to the HBA in 2007, but the changes only affected financing of the 
boards, further solidifying their position and, in turn, weakening the capacity of district councils 
to effectively supervise hospital operations. Their composition reflects Sierra Leone’s 
patrimonial politics (Conteh and Harris 2014). Despite attempts by the MoHS to solidify their 
legal basis, the boards have become avenues for the exercise and distribution of patronage, as 
loyal ruling party supporters are rewarded with membership (Conteh 2014a). By early 2012, the 
board members’ terms had expired; yet, no move was made to renew or replace them, causing 
some of the councils and medical staff to challenge their legitimacy when they attempted to 
supervise health centres (Interview with Director of Hospital Services, Ministry of Health and 
Sanitation, 9 February 2012, Freetown). One of the reasons for the ineffective exercise of 
supervisory and administrative control of councils over ‘devolved’ health staff stems from the 
fact that the recruitment and payment of staff salaries remain centrally controlled. Local councils 
do not have the power to hire and fire them, apart from their own core staff. In fact for many 
officials, ‘resisting payroll devolution ensures that line ministries can treat local councils as little 
more than disbursement agencies’ (Fanthorpe et al. 2011: 23).  
 
In the health sector, it is the hospital boards and DHMTs – not local councils – that retain power 
over recruiting and disciplining health staff. Thus, health workers tend to show greater 
accountability to the DHMTs, which are responsible for their recruitment and promotion, rather 
than to local politicians and administrators. The 2010 decentralization policy envisaged that in 
addition to councils’ core staff, they will be able to hire and fire devolved sector employees by 
2016 (Government of Sierra Leone, 2010a; Srivastava and Larizza, 2011), and their payroll will 
be transferred to them as well. However, given the recent lacklustre political will, the absence of 
a decentralization champion in government (Fanthorpe et al. 2011; World Bank, 2011), and 
politicians’ shifting focus towards the general elections in 2017, it is unlikely that the target date 
will be met. In addition, the unimpressive response of local councils to the Ebola epidemic is 
likely to undermine their case for increased powers and responsibility.      
 
Underpinning the inconsistent policy and legal framework, is the culture of resistance of the 
administrative and political officials in the MoHS that reinforces a political economy in which 
the distribution of power and resources is skewed against local councils. On paper, the MoHS is 
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the only ministry to have ‘systematically’ followed the ‘devolution’ schedule of the LGA and 
statutory instrument of November 2004 (Whiteside 2007; Institutional Reform and Capacity 
Building Project, 2007; 2008a; 2008b; 2009). However, in practice, the ministry has resisted 
meaningful devolution by retaining functions that carry with them financial power and 
significant resource allocations (Republic of Sierra Leone 2007; Kargbo 2009). Whereas the 
MoHS agreed to devolve the procurement of equipment and medicines to local councils 
(Government of Sierra Leone 2004), it has retained 40 per cent of the total amount for the 
provision of primary health care services at the centre (Republic of Sierra Leone 2007). 
Officially, the Ministry’s reason for retaining the most significant budget lines is to reduce 
wastage, which has been inherent in the procurement and delivery of medical supplies to health 
facilities across the country (Government of Sierra Leone 2006). Nevertheless, the political 
economy of procurement contracts in Sierra Leone (Workman 2011) has also served as an 
incentive for doing so. In one case, some of the most senior officials of the ministry, including a 
minister, were involved in illegitimate activities that influenced outcomes of tendering processes 
(Standard Times, 4 November 2009). 
 
MoHS officials have been involved in one corruption scandal after another in the post-war era, 
although they are not always found guilty (Kargbo 2014).  A real-time audit of the management 
of funds intended for the response against the Ebola epidemic in 2014, documented systematic 
violations of procurement procedures and laws by some Ministry of Health officials, who were 
unable to properly account for billions of Leones, purportedly paid out to district health 
management teams to tackle the disease in their districts (Audit Service Sierra Leone 2015).  It is 
this institutional culture that has shaped the behaviour of many officials in the MoHS. Oyono  
has argued that because decentralization is often a process that involves transferring political 
power and resources, it invariably causes jealousy, apprehension, and overt opposition (Oyono 
2004). Therefore the resistance of MoHS officials to devolution is perhaps unsurprising, even if 
it has proved inimical to service delivery. As Blair (1998:20) puts it:  
 
In most developing countries, most politicians and civil servants operating in the national 
political arena perceive that power will be devolved to the local level at their expense. This 
is especially true in the unitary states characteristic of most of the developing world. 
 
Fanthorpe et al. describe devolved sector staff as ‘generally enthusiastic about 
decentralization…on the grounds that it channels unprecedented volumes of resources to their 
sectors and gives them greater autonomy in administrative decision-making’ (2011:23). 
However, local politicians have cited the retention of budget lines relating to procurement as an 
issue that undermines their capacity to determine the type, quantity and quality of drugs and 
medical supplies that are needed in a particular district’s health facilities (Institutional Reform 
and Capacity Building Project 2007). The practice of public officials resisting reforms and 
expanding their sphere of influence in terms of their expropriation capacity, albeit illegally, is not 
new in Sierra Leone (Reno 1995). Like many African countries where the dualistic existence of 
the ‘moral’ and ‘civic’ publics survived colonialism (Ekeh 1975), many public officials have 
tended to view the state as an exploitable resource for furthering their personal interests, and not 
an entity to protect.  
 
As Oyono (2004) argues, the instinct to preserve the ‘consumable’ profits of the central elite is 
the basis for resistance, which in Sierra Leone, sometimes takes place between officials of 
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central government ministries, as they clash over the control of powers and resources that should 
have been devolved (Conteh 2014a). The Minister of Local Government continues to push for 
devolution without success, and in some cases comes into conflict with her colleagues. For 
example, in early 2014, the ministers of Health and Local Government were embroiled in a 
contest over the control of secondary and tertiary hospitals, which had been ‘devolved’ to the 
local councils since 2005. In a move that illustrated the resistance of MoHS officials to 
devolution, and the extent to which they can go to recentralize devolved functions, the Minister 
of Health directed the Director of Hospital Services to take over the running of the hospitals. The 
official rationale for doing so was ‘because the local councils are not responsible’ enough to 
manage them (Interview, Legal and Policy Officer, Decentralization Secretariat, 1 April 2014, 
Freetown). The move by the Minister of Health is unsurprising given that, of the 80 functions to 
be devolved by central government ministries, slightly more than half have been devolved since 
2004, with some recentralizing what had already been devolved (Conteh 2014a). Despite 
protestations from the Minster of Local Government and Rural Development, the decision was 
not rescinded, deepening tensions between officials of the two ministries (Interview, Legal and 
Policy Officer, Decentralization Secretariat, 1 April 2014, Freetown).  
 
Coordinating and implementing primary health care: Government and non-governmental 
actors 
 
The resistance to decentralization and the recentralization of functions, is further compounded by 
the erratic transfer of funds to local councils. This has not only affected the timely delivery of 
services by the local councils and DHMTs, it has also undermined their capacity to regulate other 
local actors, including NGOs operating in the health sector.  In theory, the local councils are in 
charge of PHC services. However, in practice the DMHTs design and implement health 
programmes, given the lack of capacity within the councils and the central government’s 
unwillingness to devolve health staff to them. Given the multiplicity of actors operating in the 
health sector and their disparate interests, coordinating their work has proved extremely difficult, 
if not impossible for the councils and DMHTs to do. 
  
The funds transferred from the central government for the implementation of health programmes 
have been erratic and unpredictable, coming long after they are really needed. By January 2013, 
for example, the allocations of funds for the third and fourth quarters of 2012 to local councils 
were still outstanding (Interview with Finance Officer, DHMT Bombali, 18 September, 2013, 
Makeni). This late and unpredictable pattern of receiving funds is caused in part by the 
Government’s practice of allocating resources to ministries, departments and agencies, including 
local councils, as revenue is collected by the National Revenue Authority. This means that the 
DHMTs have had to rely on funds provided by other donors, which are in many ways more 
predictable than those from government coffers. This exacerbates tensions with the councils, as 
the DHMTs do not report to them on the receipt and expenditure of such funds (Interview with 
Local Government Finance Officer, Bombali District Council, 3 April 2012, Makeni). For 
instance, according to their internal accounting mechanisms, only 77.5 percent of the total 
funding received by the Bombali DHMT in 2011 was accounted for through the district council. 
Ideally, local councils formulate policies relating to health care on the ground, while the DHMTs 
implement them. Many donor agencies and international NGOs prefer transferring funds directly 
to DHMTs, because of the councils’ chequered history with corruption and because it means 
they can avoid an extra layer of red tape in programme implementation.  
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The result, however, is that some aspects of health programme implementation becomes 
accountable not to the district council, but to the donors and NGOs (Interview with District 
Medical Officer, Bombali, 17 October 2011, Makeni). This is partly due to the fact that 
transparency remains a problem, and opportunities to misappropriate decentralized resources are 
more prevalent in the programme implementation stages than at the policy formulation levels 
(Interview with Area Base Manager, Western NGO, 11 December 2012, Port Loko). In many 
instances, it is the interests and incentives of the local elite – local political and administrative 
officials and DHMT staff – that determine where and how funds are spent, rather than the 
objectively assessed medical needs of the poor. Allocation of funding and projects functions as a 
form of political patronage, either through the provision of services, contracts, or in the worst 
cases, graft and misused funds. The sides that emerge victorious in discussions over expenditure 
are those who are not only savvy negotiators, but who are also politically connected and 
powerful (Interview with Area Base Manager, Western NGO, 11 December 2012, Port Loko). 
Generally, in the development of health plans and budgets, local councils favour capital intensive 
projects, while DHMTs prefer increased spending on administration and capacity building 
programmes.  
  
Local councils often award procurement contracts for capital projects, which sometimes come 
with ‘kickbacks’ (Workman, 2011), adding to the incentive for having such programmes 
dominate health budgets. In addition, local politicians can derive immense credit from capital 
projects during elections, since many of them are tangible for voters to see. For instance, 
although the establishment of PHUs is supposed to be based on the health needs of the 
population, in a context of resource scarcity, the decision to construct PHUs – or not – has often 
been influenced by political considerations and the interests of politicians. Politicians use such 
projects to demonstrate their commitment to ‘take development to their people’, in what can be 
an effective vote-buying strategy, sometimes even if it means depriving other communities, 
where such facilities are potentially in even shorter supply (Interview with Deputy Chief 
Administrator, Bombali District Council, 5 September 2011, Makeni). The drive to build new 
facilities also appears to outpace the need for renovations and repairs.   
 
Although it is difficult to measure and document the scale of graft and mismanagement of funds 
given the variations in their occurrence and officials’ tolerance for them across local councils, 
where it occurs, less is spent on the actual delivery of services, such as drugs and equipment, 
particularly in the face of shortages requiring quick mobilization of resources. For example, in 
one case in the Kambia District, the local council awarded a contract for the renovation of two 
PHUs, and paid the contractor 100 per cent of the project’s cost, deviating from the usual 
practice of paying them in tranches depending on work completed (Interview with Western 
donor Operations Officer, 15 February 2013, Freetown). Donors eventually visited the project 
sites after persistent media coverage over delays and uncompleted works, finding that the 
contractor had paid a substantial kickback to the local council officials that made it difficult for 
him to finance the project’s completion (Interview with Station Manager, Radio MAWOPNET, 5 
August 2013, Kambia).  
 
Whereas local councils prefer having capital projects dominate health budgets, given the 
personal and political advantages derived from them by their officials, the DHMTs, on the other 
hand, prefer inserting into health budgets programmes relating to administration costs and 
10 
 
capacity building, areas which also involve procurements contracts, but with leverage for the 
teams to solely undertake, without going through the rent-seeking procurement procedures of the 
councils – an arrangement which nonetheless, can accrue DHMTs significant kickbacks 
(Interview with Senior Economist, Local Government Finance Department, 18 April 2012, 
Freetown). The consistent and persistent manner in which DHMTs increased the costs of 
administration and capacity building programmes across the country forced the Local 
Government Finance Department to place a ceiling on the extent to which the teams can allocate 
funds to such programmes (Interview with the Director of Local Government Finance 
Department, 18 April 2012, Freetown). Although one can argue that spending on capital 
expenditure can benefit the poor, this is only indirectly, since health services can be delivered 
even in makeshift structures, as is often the case in some rural communities; and for capacity 
building programmes, the frequent and haphazard manner in which they are conducted, 
sometimes leaving PHUs without nurses for weeks, undermines the very basis for which they are 
conducted.  
 
Where the local councils and DHMTs have not been able to strike a workable compromise 
regarding the “redistribution” of decentralized resources, there has been a near breakdown of 
services as the local councils refuse to release funds for the implementation of programmes. This 
was the case in Port Loko in 2012, where the District Medical Officer was reported to have 
refused to agree to a deal in which the DHMT would allow the council to retain 30 per cent of 
the district’s health budget as its “share” of the funds transferred from Freetown (Interview with 
Area Base Manager, Western NGO, 11 December 2012, Port Loko). The stalemate continued for 
six months, during which most health programmes in the district were not implemented, save for 
those supported by NGOs (Interview with District Births and Deaths Registrar, 11 December 
2012, Port Loko). Cooperation between the local council and DHMT was only re-established 
when the DMO was controversially transferred to another district, a posting that was believed to 
have been engineered by the chairman of the local council (Interview with Area Base Manager, 
Western NGO, 11 December 2012, Port Loko). Whilst the Port Loko case represents an extreme 
example of services grinding to a halt due to the irreconcilable interests of the local council and 
DHMT, it is not uncommon for the provision of services across the country to suffer due to a 
combination of factors, including personality clashes between district council officials and 
DMOs, and challenges relating to transparency and accountability, underpinned by a ubiquitous 
sense of moral hazard, given that officials can always shift the risks and consequences of their 
(in) actions to others.  
 
In addition to the strained relationship between local councils and DHMTs, their individual 
attempts to regulate and coordinate the operations of NGOs, have been largely unsuccessful. 
Decades of systemic neglect and the civil war of the 1990s left the country’s service delivery 
infrastructure severely weakened; and the state’s abdication of responsibility for the provision of 
certain services in the interior of the country was accompanied by the growth and expansion of 
the NGO industry, which filled the resulting gap (Conteh 2014b; Nishimuko 2009; Zack-
Williams 1999). By the end of the War, NGOs became entrenched and wielded immense 
influence in the provision of services for communities. Therefore, the provision of health 
services by the local councils in the post-war period requires the coordination of activities among 
local actors, including local councils, DHMTs, NGOs and PHU staff, whose interests and 
incentives are varied and often conflicting.  
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The number of health related NGOs operating in Sierra Leone is uncertain, but in mid 2015 the 
NGO desk of the MoHS had on its register 89 (59 international and 30 local), all of them 
implementing programmes across the country, whose interventions often duplicate and overlap 
with each other (Interview with NGO Desk Officer, Ministry of Health and Sanitation, 31 July 
2015, Freetown). The fact that NGOs often bypass the local councils and deal directly with 
DHMTs in the implementation of health programmes does not mean that the relationship 
between NGOs and DHMTs has not been characterized by tensions and suspicions. Few 
regulatory safeguards exist in Sierra Leone’s NGO sector to prevent misappropriation of funds 
and other resources, and it is not uncommon for actors to become suspicious of one another, 
especially if their activities appear uncoordinated and obscure.  
 
Given the goodwill enjoyed by most international NGOs, their increased access to resources 
relative to their overall mandate, and their minimal oversight, they have by and large operated 
outside the control or regulatory framework of District Councils. Although they have contributed 
to the rebuilding of the country’s primary healthcare infrastructure, some aspects of their work 
have been uncoordinated, thus creating governance and systems problems, while attempting to 
solve individual and household-level health problems. For instance in Bonthe District, one 
Western NGO is reported to have constructed PHUs without the knowledge and authorization of 
the local council and the DHMT, the relevant institutions that would have advised on the 
communities where such facilities are needed, as well as the specifications of the buildings. As 
the DMO noted:  
 
A major problem we have here is the uncoordinated operations of the NGOs. They will construct 
PHUs, without informing us, and at the end of the day, they expect us to provide staff and 
equipment for them (Interview with District Medical Officer, Bonthe, 3 August 2013, Mattru 
Jong). 
 
The uncoordinated construction of health facilities by NGOs, and the contestation of the DHMT 
is not only a symbol of centralized planning pre-empting local knowledge and decision-making 
power, it also illustrates the failure of regulation, and NGOs’ disregard for even the minimum 
established protocols, given the weak regulatory framework under which they operate. 
Generally, getting NGOs to effectively coordinate their activities with the local authorities has 
not been easy. Attempts by local council officials, many of whom have worked for NGOs, to get 
NGOs to be more transparent in their operations have largely proved ineffective. In Bo District, 
the council established an NGO forum for sharing their activities with council staff, and 
preventing duplications and overlapping of health and other programmes (Awareness Times, 12 
March, 2013). Yet, the initiative was undermined by the poor level of their reporting and the 
non-attendance of the ‘big’ ones.2 When asked why the NGOs were not taking the forum 
seriously, the council’s Monitoring and Evaluation Officer replied that, ‘they just don’t want to 
be accountable, because they think we will know how they are expending their budgets’, 
implying that international NGOs are misappropriating funds meant for development in the 
district (Interview with Monitoring and Evaluation officer, Bo District Council, 13 August 2013, 
Bo). 
 
The challenge of local and international NGOs not accounting to either local councils or central 
government for funds they receive for the implementation of projects in rural Sierra Leone has 
been a topical issue. In early 2014, parliament set up a special select committee to investigate 
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them. Some NGOs did not present the documents the committee wanted to examine, which led 
the chairman to warn that they will be charged with contempt (Awareness Times, 7 March, 2014; 
Concord Times, 10 March, 2014). In some ways, the action of parliament is unusual, even if it 
has the mandate to do so, and raises suspicions of attempts to frighten vociferous NGOs into 
submission, especially when some of them were very critical of the activities of both the ruling 
and opposition parties during the 2012 elections. Nonetheless, it is a very popular action, as 
many people hold the view that NGOs need to account for funds they receive ‘on behalf of the 
people of Sierra Leone’ (Radio Democracy FM 98.1, Good morning Salone, 7 March 2014, 
Freetown). The tensions between local councils, central government, and NGOs has resulted in 
those actors responsible for the delivery of health services trying to outmanoeuvre each other to 
acquire power and influence, with the health needs of the poor merely a secondary priority to the 
political business of contested oversight and authority. 
 
Primary health care infrastructure, staffing, and management of health facilities 
 
This article has thus far examined the myriad ways in which local councils, DHMTs, and NGOs 
compete to control resources and to determine which areas receive intervention at the district 
level. However, the infrastructure, staffing, and management of PHUs, around which the 
interaction between service users and health workers revolves, are equally, if not more, fraught 
with challenges. As described above, the construction of PHUs by NGOs, community 
associations, and private individuals is so uncoordinated that the Directorate of Primary 
Healthcare in the Ministry of Health does not know the exact number of facilities in the country 
(Interview with Measurement and Evaluation Officer, Directorate of Primary Health Care, 7 
August, 2013, Freetown). In 2009, Sierra Leone had about 870 PHUs. By August 2013, the 
figure was over 1390 – an increase of roughly 520 PHUs in five years (Interview with 
Monitoring and Evaluation Officer, Directorate of Primary Health Care, 7 August 2013, 
Freetown). This dramatic increase may be partly a reflection of the need for rebuilding the 
country’s health infrastructure in the wake of the civil war. However, while the reconstruction of 
the country’s war-torn health infrastructure could be indicative of an effective and fast-moving 
recovery effort, much of the NGO and donor driven development has not been properly 
incorporated into the government-operated health system (Local Government Finance 
Department, n/a; Bombali DHMT, 2008; 2011; Moyamba DHMT, 2012; Kambia DHMT, 2013). 
A survey conducted by UNICEF in early 2015, for example, noted that the country had 1185 
government-owned PHUs. The disparities between the numbers of the government and its 
partners point to the general challenge of the availability of reliable data to inform planning in 
the sector.  
 
Moreover, where health facilities are present, they are often marginally functional. In Bombali 
District, over 43 per cent of PHUs were either in need of major rehabilitation or replacement in 
2008 (Bombali DHMT, 2008). In Bo District in 2011, 30 per cent of the PHUs were ‘...found to 
be in a very bad shape and needed urgent rehabilitation...’ (Bo DHMT, 2011a:2). In addition, 
throughout the country, many PHUs are operated from private-owned houses that are not 
designed to undertake the delivery of health services in the first place, and which are further 
dilapidated (Bombali DHMT, 2011; Bo DHMT, 2011b; Kambia DHMT, 2013). In many rural 
communities, where purpose-built health facilities do not exist, health workers operate out of 
makeshift structures, capitalising on spaces designed for other services. In some Tonkolili 
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District villages, for example, health workers used rooms in the staff quarters of community 
schools.3  
 
Further to the infrastructural problems and partly as a result of the above-described 
mismanagement, there is a dire shortage of health professionals. Primary health units are 
designed to have at least three health staff – a nurse, vaccinator and midwife. However, it is not 
uncommon to have just one nurse serving a catchment area of 15 or more villages. In Bonthe 
District, for example, 15 out of 55 PHUs were functioning with just one nurse at the time of 
fieldwork, a year before the Ebola outbreak (Interview with District Medical Officer, Bonthe, 3 
August 2013, Matru Jong). Sierra Leone, with one of the highest maternal mortality rates in the 
world, had just 95 midwives across the country in 2010 – 205 short of what was needed to serve 
all health facilities (King 2010). The ratio of nurses and midwifes was 0.36 per 1000 people in 
2009, and just 0.03 physicians (Kinfu et al. 2009). Overall density of physicians, nurses, and 
midwives per 1000 of the population was thus 0.39, with an annual growth rate of 1.7, compared 
to a population growth rate of 2.6 per cent (Kinfu et al. 2009). The workforce growth rate 
required to adequately serve the country was an impossible 16.1 per cent. There are a variety of 
factors that have led to such paltry numbers of health workers. First, many health professionals 
left the country during or as a result of the civil war. Second, the poor conditions of service in the 
health sector mutually reinforce the undesirability of working in such a medical environment. 
Further, the remoteness of rural outposts are places where highly-skilled health workers, many of 
whom are from and trained in urban areas, would prefer not to work (Interview with District 
Medical Officer, Bonthe, 3 August 2013, Matru Jong). The result is that the most marginalised 
communities stay underserved for the same reasons that drive marginality in the first place.  
 
The Health Service Commission (HSC) which is expected to ‘raise staff numbers, and improve 
retention rates and the conditions of service for health workers’ (Ministry of Health and 
Sanitation, 2010b:15) is yet to become effectively functional, due to its capacity and resource 
constraints. As it grapples with its challenges, the MoHS and Human Resources Management 
Office (HRMO) continue to directly recruit health workers at the national level ‘because the 
human resources needed to deliver health services are highly technical’ (Interview, Director of 
Hospital Services, MoHS, 9 February 2012, Freetown). This marks yet another way in which 
power is not devolved to the local level, as the MoHS fears ‘losing control’ over local health 
personnel if recruitment were devolved to the councils.  
 
Compounding the challenges posed by the general shortage of health workers, the distribution of 
personnel - like other health resources – by MoHS has not always reflected the individual needs 
of PHUs and their catchment communities. Powerful local and national elites often lobby the 
MoHS for their chiefdoms to be assigned more health workers than required, relative to the 
needs of other areas (Interview, District Operations Officer, Bombali DHMT, 24 March 2012, 
Makeni). Nurses have also learned to influence postings by compromising staff, seeking to be 
assigned to areas they feel more comfortable working. These areas are generally more 
developed, nearer to big towns and cities, and where the nurses can make additional money by 
running private clinics in their homes (Interview, District Operations Officer, Bombali DHMT, 
24 March 2012, Makeni). The MoHS is considering the introduction of remote allowances to 
motivate nurses to live and work in deep rural areas. It is unclear whether that alone will 
compensate for the challenges of working in those areas, if other enablers, such a staff quarters 
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and social amenities, are excluded from the planned incentive package (Interview, District 
Operations Officer, Bombali DHMT, 24 March 2012, Makeni). 
 
The final level of challenges that result from the myriad capacity and governance challenges in 
the Sierra Leone health system is the micro-level management of PHU funds and services. Even 
where PHUs are staffed, their professionalism and treatment of service users can be problematic. 
The management arrangements of health facilities have undergone numerous rapid changes since 
the launch of the decentralization programme in 2004, with a myriad of foreign policies and 
initiatives being borrowed and tested, turning the country and its health system into a laboratory 
for donor experiments. Prior to 2011, each PHU was allocated LE 1 million Leones (US$ 227) in 
operating costs per quarter (Interview with DMOs and CHOs and Health Workers in Bo, 
Bombali and Bonthe – 2011, 2012, 2013). The funds were meant to undertake minor renovations 
to the PHUs, payment for toiletries, and the payment of Traditional Birth Attendants (TBAs), 
who assist Maternal and Child Health Aides (MCHAs) in child delivery, but are not on the 
official payroll (Interview with Finance Officer, DHMT Bombali, 18 September 2011, Makeni). 
 
The cash-to-facility mechanism had a number of challenges. First, payments were irregular and, 
when paid, often saw only a fraction going to PHUs, as senior DHMT staff deducted an 
unspecified amount for administrative fees or bank charges (Interviews with CHOs and Health 
Workers, 2011-2012, Bombali and Bo Districts). The fraction that would be paid was not 
properly accounted for, as Community Health Officers (CHOs) and other staff rarely kept 
detailed records on how the funds were spent (Interview, Northern Region Coordinator with 
Health for All Coalition, 23 October 2011, Makeni). In Bombali District, none of the in-charges 
of PHUs liquidated their accounts with the DHMT finance office in 2011, making it impossible 
for the team to account to external auditors for how over LE 200 million was spent by the district 
PHUs, partly due to the fact that, the transfer of financial responsibility was not accompanied by 
the necessary capacity building required to manage the funds (Interview with Finance Officer, 
Bombali DHMT, 29 January 2013, Makeni). The lack of accountability at the PHU level echoes 
inconsistent and weak accountability from the DHMTs themselves. In Pujehun District, for 
example, the Parliamentary Oversight Committee on Finance and Economic Development 
discovered that the DHMT could not account for LE 27 million worth of drugs supplied by the 
district council in July 2013 (Awareness Times, 23 July, 2013). More importantly, on top of 
these accountability problems, the cash-to-facility system did not adequately incentivise 
increased utilization of facilities by service users as funds were paid regardless of whether 
patients accessed the facilities.  
 
The challenges associated with the cash-to-facility finance mechanisms were identified in an 
MoHS and donor-led review of PHU financing that led to the introduction of a new 
performance-based financing (PBF) scheme in 2011 (Interview with Finance Officer, Bombali 
DHMT, 29 January 2013, Makeni). Supported by the World Bank, the PBF system was 
borrowed from Rwanda, where it was deemed to have been highly successful in increasing 
access to health services and making health workers accountable (Interview with Western donor 
Communications Specialist, 1 February 2013, Freetown). According to the government 
document, the system ‘distributes funding to health service providers according to the outputs 
(health service provision) or outcomes (health status of the target population) that they provide’ 
(Government of Sierra Leone, 2011:9). Specifically, performance-based funds are designed to 
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increase uptake of services through a battery of health-supporting incentives. These include 
rewards and compensation for TBAs, light food, like soup, for pregnant women during antenatal 
visits, small ‘baby packs’ for women delivering at health facilities, gifts to husbands who 
accompany their wives during deliveries, and bathing soap for mothers after delivery (Ministry 
of Health and Sanitation 2011). 
 
Given that performance-based finance is made according to health facilities’ outputs, not inputs, 
funding is based on scores in six areas for which PHUs are monitored on a quarterly basis. These 
include: women accessing contraception through the facility; women receiving a fourth antenatal 
consultation with a health professional; pregnant women in labour being attended by a health 
professional; postpartum women receiving three consultations with a health professional; 
children aged less than 12 months completing the Expanded Programme on Immunization (EPI); 
and children under-five receiving outpatient consultation at the facility (Government of Sierra 
Leone, 2011; Ministry of Health and Sanitation, n.d.). These reflect the country’s overall 
emphasis on improving maternal and under-five health, a push that has been particularly strong 
since the 2010 introduction of free healthcare for pregnant women and children under five, as the 
country struggles to improve its Millennium Development Goal indicators, albeit without a 
coherent policy to drive the process. Facilities are also required to meet a number of cross-
cutting and quality standards including: maintaining accurate facility attendance registers; reports 
on facility management; minutes of the Village Development Committee (VDC) signed by the 
chairman; a wall-chart displaying facility performance, registers, tally sheets and drugs records; 
and ensuring that the PHU and its environment is clean (Ministry of Health and Sanitation, n/a; 
Government of Sierra Leone, 2011).  
 
Of the total performance-based funding allocated to a health facility, ‘a maximum of 60 per 
cent...may be used as incentives to PHU staff and the remaining 40 per cent or more, spent on 
operational costs and minor investments at the facility’ (Ministry of Health and Sanitation, n/a: 
2-3). In the vast majority of health facilities, in-charges continue to use the maximum 60 per cent 
on staff incentives (Interview with Finance Officer, Bombali DHMT, 29 January 2013, Makeni). 
Although the performance-based finance operational manual details strategies to ensure 
compliance and to prevent health workers from falsifying data in order to increase their quarterly 
funding, they frequently do manipulate the data, and obtain fraudulent receipts and invoices to 
justify their expenditures (Interviews with Finance Officer, Bombali DHMT, 29 January, 2013, 
Makeni; District Medical Officer, Bonthe, 3 July 2013, Matru Jong). In a well known case at 
Sanda Tendaren Chiefdom, Bombali District, health workers from a PHU collected the names of 
all the children in the local school, and reconciled them with those on the facility’s attendance 
register, even when they did not attend the facility in that quarter, so that supervisors would not 
detect inconsistencies and falsifications in the records (Interview with Community Development 
Coordinator, Local NGO, 25 January 2013, Makeni). In addition to fraudulent records, the PBF 
system is being undermined by the continued levying of additional and illicit fees for patient 
services. Despite the fact that the PBF is intended to increase clinic attendance by providing 
incentives to individual service users, health workers often demand that women pay for their 
children’s record-keeping books and purchase toiletries when they deliver their children; and 
light food and other incentives are often not being provided for women during antenatal visits, 
despite being covered by the PBF (Interview with Finance Officer, Bombali DHMT, 29 January 
2013, Makeni).  
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In their study of the different manifestations of corruption in Francophone West Africa, Blundo, 
et al (2006:74) found that the charging of unwarranted fees often ‘exploits the diligence or zeal 
of users and generally takes advantage of their ignorance of the fees officially charged.’ In Sierra 
Leone, part of the problem underpinning the charging of unwarranted fees by health workers 
stems from a serious lack of information on the existence of PBF funds among Village 
Development Committees and community members. Health workers deliberately guard such 
information from service users. No case illustrates this situation better than that of the Safroko 
Limba Chiefdom headquarter town of Binkolo, where it took a community sensitization meeting 
organized by the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) to inform community members of the 
quarterly payments to PHUs, a revelation that was greeted with great surprise by the audience.4  
Although the charging of unwarranted fees increases the financial burden of service users, there 
is a somewhat ambivalent tolerance for it, as both service providers and users justify it on the 
basis of low salaries (Blundo et al. 2006:74). At the community level, the fear of having no nurse 
increases tolerance for unwarranted fees, as a bad one is seen as better than no nurse at all. 
 
Apart from the charging of unwarranted fees by health workers and their concealing of vital 
information from service users, the decision of the MoHS to bypass the DHMTs and directly 
transfer quarterly instalments of performance-based funds into the bank accounts of PHUs has 
further complicated the accountability cycle. This increases suspicions and tensions among the 
DHMTs and health workers, as the latter frequently conceal information regarding the time of 
payment and the amount from the DHMTs (Interview with Finance Officer, Bombali DHMT, 29 
January 2013, Makeni). As a result, DHMTs have been reduced to merely receiving financial 
returns from PHUs, documents whose authenticity is all the more difficult to verify when DHMT 
Monitoring and Evaluation Officers are suspected of colluding with health staff in the utilization 
of PBF funds (Interview with Finance Officer, Bombali DHMT, 29 January 2013, Makeni).  
 
The weak oversight of PHU staff by the DHMTs means that service users remain at the mercy of 
health workers and, given their lack of knowledge of what is due them, they can hardly hold 
them accountable even if they want to do so. As Booth (2010:4) notes, one of the key factors 
underpinning differences in the outcome of public goods provision across different countries is 
the extent to which service providers ‘are subject to effective top-down performance disciplines, 
even if in other respects the organizational context is severely lacking in the attributes of a well-
resourced and well-regulated bureaucracy’. Further, the project has dubious sustainability 
implications for a country whose health sector is largely donor-dependent. As Booth describes, 
where ‘the superimposition of successive waves of public sector reform, often under donor 
influence [occur] without sufficient efforts to resolve the inconsistencies thereby created’, such 
reform measures are almost always bound to fail (2010:8-9). In practice, performance-based 
financing amounts to the World Bank doubling the salaries of health workers for performing the 
jobs for which they are recruited and paid to do by the government, while creating a culture of 
reporting that is detached from meaningful monitoring and evaluation standards. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This article has analysed the decentralization of primary health services in Sierra Leone through 
a multi-level analysis of the delivery system, its legal and policy framework, and the political 
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economy at the local, district, and national level. It identifies a culture of resistance at the centre 
to any meaningful devolution of power and finances, as well as fraught coordination 
relationships among local actors responsible for the delivery of health services. Finally, these 
dysfunctional patterns continue at the community level in the tenuous relationship between 
service providers and users. 
  
The challenges besetting the country’s decentralization of primary health care illustrate the 
difficulties involved in bridging the gap between the lofty goals espoused in policy documents 
and the reality of fixing long broken social services and the infrastructure needed for delivery. 
Reform programmes, such as decentralization, promoted by donors and designed to dislodge 
embedded structures and interests, are as much political as they are technical. Therefore, both 
political economy and technical factors responsible for implementation failures have to be  
adequately understood and addressed. The purposes and uses of the legal and policy framework 
have not only been regulatory, they have also been politically instrumental, as they have been 
selectively and conveniently interpreted and applied to suit, primarily, central government 
interests. 
 
Whereas decentralization is often seen as a process that aligns user preferences with government 
policies, reforming social services in states such as Sierra Leone, long immersed in destructive 
forms of patrimonial politics, requires a more careful mapping of actors and their interests and an 
incentive system that ensures that reform does not become a zero-sum game that triggers 
insurmountable resistance by the elites benefiting from the status quo. The launch of the Sierra 
Leone decentralization programme in 2004 created a crisis of legitimacy for central government 
officials, who had long used state resources to support patronage networks that enabled them to 
maintain influence, if not control, over the periphery. Although on paper the biggest winners of 
decentralization have been local actors in the form of councillors, local administrators, NGO 
staff, and nurses, in reality, the central elites’ influence over the periphery in the delivery of 
health services remains largely intact.  
 
As with central government officials, understanding the imperatives and actions of local actors 
requires an understanding of the societal and other pressures to which they constantly have to 
respond. They, too, need to reciprocate the favour of their superiors at the centre. They need to 
maintain political support and win re-election. They need to provide social services, often while 
appropriating or diverting public resources to demonstrate success in a political economy that 
rewards wealth and patronage. These and other social and political constraints are essential for 
understanding the failures and weaknesses of the Sierra Leone health system and 
decentralization’s intended panacea.  
 
The policy implications for designing and implementing decentralization programmes are a 
much more robust understanding of local contexts and contested interests. The histories, politics, 
economics and cultural dynamics of societies should help shape the nature of decentralized 
institutions, rather than notions or models borrowed from outside.  Indeed the unregulated 
operations of NGOs, which implement programmes “borrowed” from contextually different 
countries, outside the framework of the development plans of the central and local governments, 
often in uncoordinated fashion, adds to the challenges. Attempts to improve the delivery of 
primary health services will require effective coordination and oversight of donors and NGOs, 
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which have generally disregarded efforts by the state to regulate their operations. As the 
country’s Ebola crisis showed, NGO and donor inputs are essential to gaining adequate 
infrastructural and health worker capacity in a resource-strapped health system. However, what 
the Ebola epidemic also revealed and what this paper has demonstrated, is that NGO activity 
without coordination at the council and ministerial level can create as many problems as it 
solves. Donors need to work not only with the MoHS, but also across the health service delivery 
chain, reinforcing management and oversight mechanisms, strengthening governance 
relationships, and abiding by – rather than undermining – the very transparency and reporting 
mechanisms they demand. 
 
In some ways the decentralization of primary health care, and indeed the decentralization 
programme generally, fits into the patterns of continuity and change that have characterised the 
country’s attempt to break away from the illiberal governance practices of the past, whilst often 
getting firmly stuck in them. Despite the many post-war reform programmes supported by 
donors, Sierra Leone has still not been able to extricate itself from the negative control exerted 
on its governance and services structures by competing powerful political and economic 
interests. This situation is reminiscent of the creation of the “Shadow State”, when powerful 
foreign business interests gained and maintained control of the functioning of the state 
machinery in the 1980s and early 1990s (Reno 1995; 1996), a phenomenon that continues to 
replicate itself in different guises.  It also reflects the long term impacts that decades of 
institutional weakness and decay, a dysfunctional political and governance culture, and the civil 
war have had on the state’s ability to deliver efficient health services to its citizens.  
 
Finally, the challenges of Sierra Leone’s decentralization of primary health services points to the 
fact that, while devolved power might be desirable, it does not necessarily provide sufficient 
guarantees that the poor will get a fair deal. The successful delivery of health services, whether 
under a decentralised or centralised system, will require genuine political commitment from 
politicians who do not just implement reforms for the political capital they can gain, but are 
willing to take a long term perspective, complemented by a robust system of top-to-bottom and 
mutual accountability. 
 
 
 
Notes  
 
                                                          
1 See section 9 of the Hospital Boards Act of 2003. 
2 Minutes of Bo District Council monthly coordination meeting, 5 October 2011; 2 November 
2011; 7 December 2011. 
3 Observations and discussions with health workers in Tonkolili District, during field visits, 18 -
22 February 2013. 
4 Focus group discussion, 7 February 2012, Binkolo. 
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